The Debrecen mega-investment and the middle-income trap
We are in our third consecutive year of non-economic crises: first a pandemic, then an uneven and uncertain recovery that severely tested the world and the integrated Hungarian economy, and for a year now we have been living with a European war. Europe has largely overcome the first two ordeals, although the inflationary pressures from the disruption of the economic re-opening and the sudden rise in food and energy prices are only just easing. In our country, it will take more time before the inflation that shot up in 2021 is tamed. The dangerous processes that began with the Russian invasion are far from over, although we can hope that these years will go down in the history books as a time when the last vestige of imperial politics in Europe finally disappeared.
As turbulent and dramatic as the last three years have been, trends and trend reversals are becoming clearer and clearer in the economic landscape. While the pandemic has brought about a sudden change in lifestyles and business relationships, the shock has also reinforced changes already underway. In 2019, we can remember, there was a wealth of data pointing to the impending end of the economic expansion in the developed world and in the related region to which we belong. There was good reason then to introduce the review of overlong supply chains, the reshoring and near-shoring of critical production activities, and soon the choice of location for security reasons (friend-shoring) into the economic policy discourse.
Free trade is a winner for us
The rearrangements of relationships were then strongly motivated by quarantines, transport disruptions and service price increases during the pandemic, but they dramatically highlighted an already recognized fact: cost containment had created overly long and potentially vulnerable production chains in the preceding decades. The global supply network guarantees a minimum cost when geographical and cultural-political distance is not an issue: in other words, when fuel is cheap, environmental pressures are not a concern, borders can be crossed without difficulty, and political risks are negligible.
The free trade process has had its dark downsides, but it has also benefited many and much, especially consumers.
Capital flows and access to markets have allowed many peripheral economies to move up the income ladder. This is also true for our region. Hungary has been a successful participant in global value chains by comparison with others following political regime change; it has attracted so much capital that today half of the value added in the non-financial sector is generated by foreign-owned enterprises. The majority of the new EU Member States have now caught up substantially with the southern periphery of the EU in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), although not in terms of actual disposable income.
No more cheap energy
However, the global order is now being transformed before our eyes; the phenomenon of tariff wars and trade blocs says a lot about the changes. Most recently,
the era of cheap energy is coming to an end, for a while anyway.
Unlike in the 1970s, it is not the physical scarcity of crude oil and the specificity of the international oil market, but the inclusion of the inevitable costs of tackling climate change that is driving up prices - permanently. The map and scale of political risk have also changed. The vast majority of European countries have moved away from dependence on Russian energy with surprising speed and efficiency within a year, but the costs of supply diversification have been high and the payback required to sustainably raise energy prices.
The new price relations and the restructuring of production chains have a critical impact on the Hungarian economy, which is one of the most open in Europe, with its own specific structural characteristics. One such asset is the automotive industry, which accounts for almost one-fifth of the GDP, and
gives the Hungarian (and Slovak) economy a strong specialisation character - but also a high exposure.
The risk stemming from this exposure is particularly serious when the sector is radically transformed by the shift to electric propulsion and the change in the safety-user concept of driving. The quarter-century-old joke that the car is a computer on four wheels is becoming increasingly true.
There is no question that Hungarian social and economic actors must position themselves in this change in accordance with our capabilities. The more difficult question is how. Government communications and measures already announced indicate that the plan is to bring further mass production of essential components (batteries) here.
This could bring the weight of the Hungarian automotive industry (with battery production) up to 30% of total industrial production.
Serious dilemmas arise both in terms of the further planned increase in the current share of this sector and the choice of product specialisation within the automotive industry.
The first case is made very difficult by the fact that societies' mobility needs are always changing, and it is difficult to predict the direction that century-old automobility will take in the next period of time, or decades - and the technological and amortisation cycle of the gigacapacities that are being built now would require a long-term forecast. It could be argued that the manufacturer of the batteries needed for electric cars bears the business risk, but this would be a formal and cynical response, since any major project involves a number of stakeholders: thousands of workers, housing estates, infrastructure, and a radical transformation of the life of the host community, all of which are investments that are heavily financed by Hungarian taxpayers.
No comparative advantage
But should such an opportunity be missed when the electric car is one of the strategic goals of the European energy and green transition? The answer is obviously that it is in our interest and our moral obligation to participate in the development process, according to our capabilities.
However, the way and extent of participation in such a strategic issue should be determined by the area in which Hungary has a comparative advantage.
After all, almost anything can be produced if necessary, but it makes economic sense to choose activities - as known since Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo - in which the national economy has a comparative advantage. Of course, tactical considerations may be different; the government could argue now that if it is so important to the European institutions that we produce batteries in European plants, to reduce our dependence on Chinese imports, then let them subsidise it, rather than having to subsidise it from the Hungarian budget, thereby diverting money from other pressing tasks. And to give a strategic response, we need to look at the input requirements of the chemical and metal production process in question: in addition to imported raw materials, we need electricity, natural gas, water, and thousands of operators (assembly workers).
Given the ongoing heated debate on the Debrecen project, let's put aside for the moment the water supply, environmental aspects, and the need for guest workers to meet the planned plant size (according to press reports, 400 of the 1500 workers currently employed at the CATL plant in Thuringia are Chinese). Let us just consider basic economics.
The answer is that Hungary has no comparative advantage in this particular area of production.
At the bottom of the smile curve
Hungary is an energy importer, and our share of imports is extremely high. According to the International Energy Agency, the total energy consumption of the Hungarian industry increased by 46% between 2010 and 2020, with more than half of the consumption being (Russian) natural gas and oil. Unlike many other economies, the share of material- and energy-intensive activities in the Hungarian industry has been rising for a longer period of time, a worrying trend even if we did not have to expect a sustained rise in energy prices. Furthermore, our demographic and labour market conditions are not favourable for such mega-investments.
However, this does not in any way preclude our organic participation in the automotive culture.
The "four-wheeled computer" requires a wide range of skills, IT support, electronics background; there will certainly be a strong market demand for the specialised cultures that Hungary has or can create (spontaneously or with support). Public development funds could go to software-related areas, leaving mass production of metals and chemicals to regions with secure and economical supplies of natural gas and electricity, or whose location near the sea or river means that both water demand and transport can be economically managed (not forgetting the obligations and costs of taking back and recycling spent batteries).
Even without knowing the specific profitability of automotive value chain components, it can be assumed that both tyre and battery production have relatively low profit margins.
The production of the battery as an industrial mass product is at the bottom of the smile curve drawn according to the profit margins in the chain from the research phase to the sale.
This is why they are also trying to produce in high volumes to reduce unit costs. It is certainly possible to run a battery factory economically, but only with moderate wages and a low tax burden. As far as the macro indicators of the host country are concerned: high production volumes will boost exports and gross production - and of course imports, because of the high import ratio; but local added value is unlikely to be high under these conditions.
The middle-income trap
This is nothing new. On a personal note, one of my very first economic policy papers was published in the journal Valóság in 1981 (A Meditation on Common Industrial Policy Issues). Examining the profitability and dollar extraction rates of the various sectors of Hungarian industry at the time, it turned out that, sorted by degree of processing, the unit profitability of the simple assembly activity of medium sophistication was lower than either the extraction of raw materials or the more processed, more complex production and service phases: the profit rates produced a U-shaped curve.
Unsurprisingly, the article suggested that Hungary should not invest its scarce development resources in the less advantaged mining sector.
Nor should it invest in the assembly industry, which is of medium sophistication and thus employs a medium-skilled workforce, even though it is in this latter area that the fastest quantitative growth can be achieved, but in the more skilled specialised crops.
Just as the term "smile curve" had not yet entered the professional vernacular, neither had the term "medium development trap" - even though statistical analyses and case studies had already shown the dangers of stagnation in Hungarian development. The low domestic added value and lack of profitability then, after 1990, put many professional cultures in danger of collapse in the face of fierce market competition. Where we had no comparative advantage, as in the case of basic steel and iron production, our companies faced bankruptcy or, at best, permanent decline as non-economic considerations (military, self-sufficiency) disappeared.
Historical parallels are never flawless, but when we hear again of re-industrialisation campaigns and mega-scale investment plans, the academic community is reminded of the bitter experiences and costly consequences of the former "country of iron and steel" experiment. But is it not too late to look for a new way forward? Is there a choice for an economy so dependent in times of technological and economic changes dictated from outside? Well, the global reordering of value chains threatens established business relationships and capacities, but there are always new opportunities.
The principle should be that we should choose the activities that fit our capabilities, including those with higher added value.
It should also be recognized that at our current rates we no longer need large-scale industry, because we have not experienced the deindustrialisation that some countries on the southern periphery have. Let us not believe that developed countries now really want to build more industry with public money; the politician may talk about "blue collar" America, but the real economic objective is to improve competitiveness and security of supply. Our goal should be nothing less than to move up the value chain in a way that is appropriate to our dimensions, our resources and our capabilities.
It would be a grave mistake to use finite resources to further expand energy-intensive sectors.
The problem would be compounded if, relying on the argument of moving towards self-sufficiency, the energy demand of the planned volume growth - ignoring our handicaps - the resources that could be used to support energy saving, quality improvement and higher added value service value chain elements were to be channelled into domestic energy production. These are areas on which a lot depends when the historical challenge for our region is to move up from the medium level of development in Europe.
THIS IS ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PORTFOLIO OPINION COLUMN.
This article reflects the views of the author, which do not necessarily reflect those of the Portfolio editorial team.
Cover photo: Martin Schutt/picture alliance via Getty Images









