György Surányi: once again on the debt crisis - reply to Tamás Mellár

Portfolio
I thank Tamás Mellár for his detailed response to the first section of my article published in Portfolio on 27 December 2024 [the English version was published on 31 December - ed.]. In my response, I return to the arguments on the basis of which Tamás Mellár continues to maintain that the Hungarian economy is "close to a crisis comparable in size and severity to the Greek one".
suranyi gyorgy2

1. Contrary to Tamás Mellár's claim, I did not basically equate the current situation of the Hungarian economy with that of Greece already in crisis, although I did touch on that as well. I compared external and internal - twin - deficits, deficits and debt levels before the crisis. The most important factor in the onset of a crisis is hardly controversially the evolution of the external balances. In Greece, the current account deficit rose to 15% before the crisis. Here, it was close to balance last year, a surplus of 2-3% is expected in 2024 and 2025 does not indicate a reversal of the trend. Greece's gross external debt stood at 106% before the crisis; here it is less than half that.

The situation of public finances is also markedly different. Prior to the crisis, Greece's current public deficit had been in double digits for years, rising to 15% in 2008. While Tamás Mellár rightly cites the damagingly high fiscal policy deficit, it is on average half of the pre-crisis Greek annual deficit, and about a third in 2024, with further reductions projected in 2025. As for debt, before the crisis, Greek debt was rising rapidly as a share of GDP, exceeding 100% in 2008. Hungarian debt is also unfavourably high, but is falling - yes, at a snail's pace - and is around 73% of GDP, or 80% if the nationalisation of private pension funds is taken into account.

2. The analysis by the European Commission, which I have also accepted (which considers the government's medium-term budget programme to be unfounded and therefore unacceptable) is obviously a very unpleasant criticism of the government. But this inconvenient fact can only be arbitrarily interpreted as putting our country at the threshold of a debt crisis.

3. The fall in the forint exchange rate is of course painful. It is also true that, with a sufficient external position and a relatively high positive real interest rate and risk premium, there is only a limited fundamental reason for the exchange rate's weakness. But in a free floating exchange rate regime, a movement of +/- 4-5% (against 390-395 EUR/HUF exchange rate) can in no way be translated into a "financial world senses the crisis situation of the Hungarian economy". For those familiar with the foreign exchange market, this is not an extreme volatility. If the market were to perceive a crisis approaching, there would be a significant withdrawal of capital, a much higher risk premium (3-600 basis points instead of 175) and/or a depreciation of well over 10%. What can be said is that a not insignificant confidence deficit has emerged. This is partly due to the ongoing dispute with the EU, the stalled drawdown of EU funds, the over-activism/unpredictability of economic policy, the drag on taxes, the restriction of market competition, corruption, the systematic failure to deliver planned and targeted macro indicators, etc.

4. 2008 IMF/EU borrowing was not at all due to high public debt or a large budget deficit. Without going into the details, the most important factor was the erroneously low foreign exchange reserves. Whether compared regionally or against short-term foreign currency debt or other benchmarks. When the financial crisis dried up liquidity in money and capital markets around the world - unexpectedly and immediately - the fundamentally flawed foreign exchange reserve policy was exposed. Before the crisis, public debt was at 64%, not 80% as Tamás Mellár writes, and the budget deficit was around 4% and on a path announced from the summer of 2006, and had been falling steadily and significantly, exceeding the commitment. So it was not fiscal policy and the level of public debt in general that got us into trouble. The IMF/EU loan was entirely to replenish foreign exchange reserves. This has contributed to a large extent to restoring market confidence. Despite the fact that it was precisely because of the increase in reserves that gross public debt jumped from 64% of GDP to close to 80%. However, the more important net public debt did not rise. But the market understood and appreciated this and did not punish our country.

5. The high interest service rate is obviously very unpleasant. It is partly a consequence of the high deficits of recent years, but even more so of mismanagement of debt. The roots go back a long way, before the current professional debt management. So-called self-financing, the voluntaristic imposition of the retail market, the artificial separation of the institutional and retail markets, and the unilateral, excessive downgrading of foreign currency funding in 2015-19 play a big role. It is not really fair to compare Hungarian interest servicing - the result of flawed policies - to that of Greece. Following the Greek default, the EU, ECB and private banks restructured and repriced debt in a comprehensive austerity programme. In other words, even today Greece is financing about 90% of its debt not from the market but at a very preferential non-market interest rate. It is another matter that Greece is now paying a lower interest rate premium than us on its new market loans as a result of the successful stabilisation.

6. In point 8 of Tamás Mellár's text, it is not clear to me what the link is between the planned increase in consumption and investment and the source of interest payments. I think there is none. Indeed, in the world of finance, it goes without saying that money cannot be rigged. The loan that is to be taken out finances all the items of expenditure in the budget in proportion to the amount of the loan, be it current or capital or, within these, interest. A new borrowing in no way indicates a crisis.

7. Nor does a cash deficit larger than the accrual deficit per se. Whether a higher cash deficit will translate into a higher accrual deficit will be decided ex post, e.g. in the EU accounts. But if this were to happen - it cannot be ruled out - it would of course be unpleasant, but it is still not a crisis. Certainly not until the external balance is permanently tipped over, until public debt starts to rise like an avalanche.

8. Electoral spending has led to years of severe austerity in 2006 and 2022. The significant damage of this is still being felt today and a recurrence cannot be ruled out. Nor is the need to borrow further abroad. But this would put solvency at risk if the current external deficit were to rise persistently/for years at a rate substantially above nominal GDP growth (avalanche effect) or if foreign exchange reserves were to decline in a trend manner. However, there is no threat of this for the time being.

9. It is a misunderstanding of the nature of the financial and capital markets, and in part an underestimation of the cynicism of the actors, that the only sources of the credit to be raised are China and the Middle East. On the one hand, if the conditions available there are no worse than normal market conditions (with no extra conditions attached, whether hedging, political, etc.), this is not in itself objectionable.

But it would be a mistake to forget that

  • we are currently members of NATO, EU, OECD,
  • in the "lower house", but we are in the category recommended for investment,
  • we have a low gross and net foreign currency debt,
  • a positive balance of payments,
  • an unblemished debt service record,
  • and a stable solvency.

The access of such a country to international money and capital markets is hardly in question. Financing such a sovereign debtor does not cause sleepless nights for creditors. Moreover, relative to the risk assumed - reflecting the level of the confidence vacuum - the 175 basis points risk premium represents a rather attractive profit for creditors.

Those familiar with the market are also aware that investors are, unfortunately, not very worried about misguided economic policy as long as it does not threaten the solvency of the debtor country in the foreseeable future. Up to a certain point, their investment decisions are hardly bothered if, for example, the Hungarian economy is a relative underperformer, if it regularly falls short of its targets, if productivity growth is disappointingly slow, if the lofty promises of economic policy are regularly not fulfilled. For these may be the central problems of the Hungarian electorate, the government and/or a potentially competitive opposition. However, as long as the hard macro indicators, above all the key external position indicators, are acceptable and appear to be so ex ante - aside from unforeseen external shocks - markets will treat the country as a stable risk and a suitable investment target. In other words, they are not worried about its solvency, they see a good deal and they do not foresee a debt crisis. That is, a closure of credit markets is not a realistic threat at the moment.

10. I agree with Tamás Mellár and many others that the government's 2025 growth plans are on even shakier ground than usual. In the second half of my article I wrote in some detail about the economic and monetary policy reasons for this. But why should, say, growth falling short of target - even significantly - bring us closer to a debt crisis?

I do not believe that the factors listed by Tamás Mellár, either individually or in combination, will necessarily lead the Hungarian economy towards a debt crisis. The economic policy being pursued is leading to slow growth and a steady lagging behind compared to the countries that have joined the EU with us. I wrote about the background to this in detail in my article.

The claim that this would make me feel any less anxious must be rejected. My article was about the exact opposite. I appreciate that Tamás Mellár also feels a moral obligation to draw attention to the dangers. But I continue to see them as unfounded. We should not cry wolf when he is still far away. I hope not, but it is possible that the time may come. For the moment, however, these unsubstantiated ideas are unduly exacerbating an otherwise justifiable vacuum of confidence in Hungarian economic policy.

This is On The Other Hand, the Portfolio opinion column.
The articles reflect the views of the authors, which do not necessarily reflect the views of the Portfolio editorial team.

Cover photo: Portfolio

 

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